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Summary of Arguments
Mitchell's conduct in failing to seek and obtain dismissal of the remaining
Reagan suits against Utah Sign and Kitchen and the filing of a motion to consolidate
instead constitutes negligence as a matter of law and the trial court should have
granted Utah Sign's motion for partial summary judgment.
Utah Sign had a legal right to establish a sign upon the Kitchen property which
was not precluded by Reagans wrongful conduct (the opportunity to undertake such
conduct being in turn permitted by Mitchell's own negligence in not obtaining
termination of the Reagan suits claiming entitlement to the Kitchen property under an
expired lease), and therefore the trial court erred in granting Mitchell's motion for
partial summary judgment barring evidence of lost anticipated profits as damages
recoverable against Mitchell.
Utah Sign seeks reversal of both decisions by the trial court and remand of the
case for trial consistent with this Courts decision.
Argument
POINT I.
THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF
ANY "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" JUSTIFYING
IGNORANCE OF THE AUTOMATIC PENALTY OF
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS PROVIDED IN URCP 41 (a)
-1-

FOLLOWING TWO VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS BY PLAINTIFF

Mitchells Brief attempts to obfuscate Rule 41(a) and change the simple and
uncomplicated nature of the rule as recognized in Thomas v. Heirs ofBaraffit, 305
P. 2d 507 (Utah 1956)1 citing, Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co. v. Noma Electric
Corp., 10 F.R.D 32, 34 (D.C.D.Md), into a tactical option requiring careful planning
and capable of multiple options. The Rule is devoid of such complication.
Mitchell's Brief argues that this Court can not summarily determine that
Mitchell's conduct infilinga Motion to Consolidate the dismissed actions rather than
a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting res judicata was patent negligence
because (1) Mitchell acted "reasonably in making a strategic decision" not to invoke
the rule and seek dismissal; (2) that an affidavit by a lawyer opining that Mitchell's
conduct was "reasonable" indisputably raises an issue of fact precluding summary
judgment; and finally, (3) the "so what" argument- that even if Mitchell erred, Utah
Sign incurred no compensable damages from such error and therefore the negligent
conduct was inconsequential. Mitchell's defense is legally flawed as to all three
points, the first two treated herein in Point I, and the third in the final Point herein.
Probably nothing attests more poignantly to the frailty of Mitchell's argument
than the complete dearth in his Responding Brief of a single citation to a case
'"We find no ambiguity in the words employed in Rule 41(a). . . " (305 P.2d at
509)
-2-

supporting the base proposition that there is substantial "attorney discretion" in Rule
41(a) as to when the Rule is likely to be enforced and its sanctions given effect and
when it will not. Mitchell's entire excuse and explanation to this Court for not
seeking to invoke the protections of Rule 41(a) is that he made what can only be
characterized as a visceral conclusion that Judge Rigtrip would "not likely invoke the
death penalty" and grant a summary judgment premised on the Rule. Yet neither
Mitchell nor his expert witness cites a single factual or legal basis upon which such
a "reasonable" deduction could be made. Neither testifies that he had previous
experience with motions filed under Rule 41(a) and/or with Judge Rigtrip and his
alleged proclivity to leniency with Plaintiffs forum shopping which would justify such
a drastic "strategical" tactic.2 Neither at the trial court summary judgment briefing
nor in this briefing process, can Mitchell cite to the Court a single decision,
statement or comment by Judge Rigtrip, or any District Court, or from this Court, or
from the Supreme Court of this State, or for that matter from any Court of record in
any other state or throughout the entire federal judiciary3 which espouses the concept

2

R. 524; R.629-632.

3

"In construing this procedural rule [Utah R. Civ. P. 35(b)(1), (3) sttbjudice], we
recognize Utah lacks guiding precedent. As such, we look to federal and state court
decisions that interpret substantially similar rules. See State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118,
1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (providing when Utah rule is essentially similar to the federal
rule of procedure, we look to "the abundance of federal experience in the area for
guidance") (Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 977 P.2d 508, 510, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Ct.
App. 1999).
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that Rule 41(a) is pregnant with exceptions which routinely mitigate its clear sanction
of adjudication on the merits through multiple dismissals. The paucity of decisions
cited in the Respondents Brief all fall woefully short of supporting Mitchell's conduct
and are easily distinguishable.
Englehart v. Bell & Howell Co., 299 F. 2d 480 (8th Cir. 1962), the first case
cited by Mitchell, is not only of little support for his anemic argument, it is forceful
repudiation of the same. Englehart filed but later voluntarily dismissed two previous
anti-trust actions against Bell & Howell, and claimed that the third action should not
have been barred because the attorney that filed and dismissed the first two actions
had no authority to dismiss them and both dismissals were without Plaintiffs prior
knowledge or consent. The Court categorically rejected the arguments, sustaining
summary judgment granted in the third action on the basis of the res judicata
attributes embodied in Rule 41(a). The only solace Mitchell gains from the case is
the "recognition" by the Court that any consideration which might be given to not
invoking the sanctions of Rule 41 (a) need to be raised directly in a motion to set
aside the second dismissed action, rather than, as was done in Englehart, by
collaterally attacking the prior dismissals with affidavits filed in the third and
surviving action raising the "no authority" issue. The case contributes nothing to
Mitchell's contention that a lawyer can viscerally decide when Rule 41(a) is
efficacious and when it is impotent.
-4-

Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F. 2d 1317 (D.C. 1987), Mitchell's principal
support for the vulnerability of Rule 41(a) is so factually distinguishable that it's
alleged support for Mitchell's conduct quickly vanishes upon closer review. Randall
twice filed suits in California against Merrill Lynch arising out of claims involving the
maintenance of securities accounts. Twice Merrill Lynch was successful in getting
the cases transferred across the country to the District of Columbia. Twice the
Plaintiff filed voluntary dismissals, and after the second dismissal, the parties went
into arbitration, but Merrill Lynch then sought termination of the arbitration on the
basis that the second dismissal disposed of the claims through res judicata. Randall
immediately filed a motion to vacate his second dismissal, filing documents
evidencing his "stress-related anxiety disorder" leaving him "certified as fully
disabled by the State of California" and therefore physically incapacitated to proceed
with the action under doctors orders {Id. p. 1319) The appellate court confirmed an
order vacating the second dismissal holding that Rule 60(b) allowing for vacation of
final judgments applies tofinaljudgments arising by operation of two dismissals under
Rule 41(a) and that a party's serious mental incapacitation making prosecution of a
pending case life threatening was sufficient "reason justifying relief" and trump the
res judicata argument. Mitchells reliance on such a drastic exemption without
relating the holding to equally mitigating conduct or circumstances extant with
Reagan renders the case interesting but of no assistance to the issue at hand.
-5-

Indeed, the record in this case is clear that Reagans actions, as he himself
unabashedly acknowledged in sworn affidavit, were flagrant "forum shopping" to find
a Judge devoid of conflict and readily available to entertain his requests for expedited
temporary rulings4, the very conduct the rule was designed to prevent.5
Mitchell also attempts to conceal the nature of the First, Second and Third
Actions by continually referring to Reagans Complaints as declaratory contract
actions seeking to determine that Reagan had exercised an "option to renew" the
Kitchen leases as if those were the principal, indeed exclusive claims asserted. True,
that is one of the Counts of each Complaint, but even Reagan knew those claims were
weak, and were merely ancillary to the "forcible entry" claims and claims for treble
damages which constitute the bulk of the allegations and relief sought in the three

4

See Affidavit of Douglas T. Hall, corporate counsel for R.O.A. indicating that he
was unaware of the consequences of Rule 41(a) when he took what he called as
"admittedly unusual" steps of dismissing and re-filing the cases to expedite a hearing of
the case. He offered no legitimate or persuasive reason other than acknowledged "forum
shopping." (Affidavit of Douglas T. Hall, filed in "the Second Action" 940905728 PR,
dated November 30, 1994)
5

(" Voluntary dismissals are also employed for reasons of forum shopping"). As
one commentator has stated: "A plaintiffs motive for dismissal is generally irrelevant
where the dismissal is effected by notice in the early stages of the litigation." 8 Moore,
supra, § 41.11, at 41-24; see also 24 Am. Jur. 2d Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit
§ 14 (1998) ("The plaintiffs purpose in seeking a dismissal is not ordinarily a material
factor in determining whether the case will be dismissed, because the plaintiffs right to
dismiss an action voluntarily before a particular stage in the proceedings is an 'absolute
right,' even though that right may be subject to abuse.").(Thie1e v. Anderson, 975 P.2d
481,fn. 12, 1999 UT App 56, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Ct. App. 1999))
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Complaints. In reality, Reagan, by the time the third Complaint was filed had already
allegedly6 secured a lease on an adjacent property (Doctorman) and had filed for and
had received State and City permits to remove and replace the Kitchen property sign
to the Doctorman property-attesting to the inconsequential and mere ancillary nature
of the "option to renew" claims of all three Complaints. By referring to the Reagan
claims as mere "contract option to renew" issues, Mitchell attempts to bring the
dismissal of those actions within the "observed7" statement in Poloron Products, Inc.,
v. LybrandRoss Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F. 2d 1012, 1017 (2nd Cir. 1976) that the
rule should not be "too broadly" nor "too literally" applied to different and unrelated
dismissed claims. A mere cursory reading of the filed and dismissed Complaints
rebuts that argument.

The holding in Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, Inc.,

96 So. 2d 215, 218 (Fla. 1957) citing, Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952)
used for the proposition that subsequent actions filed after two previous dismissals
which are factually distinguishable and not in any way related to the dismissed actions
are not barred are equally distinguishable. In the case subjudice, Reagan prayed in
all three Complaints for treble punitive damages, recoverable only by law in Utah as
6

On remand Utah Sign will present evidence that no lease existed when Reagan
obtained a permit to erect a sign on the Doctorman property and the UDOT and SLC
permits were, therefore, fraudulently obtained.
7

To his credit, my worthy opponent acknowledges that the cited portion of the
decision is not the "holding" in Poloron, but a mere "observation" by the Court- another
term for "obiter dictum, "
-7-

a result of wrongful and forcible entry on property held under existing leasehold
rights. True, when filed, all three Complaints alleged that the forcible entry was
imminent, or that Kitchen's conduct in dealing with a competing sign company was
such sufficient interference as to constitute a "forcible entry" in fact, worthy of
treble damages. Factually, after the three Complaints were filed, and before any of
them were dismissed, the "anticipated" physical invasion occurred, Utah Sign went
onto the property and cut down the Reagan sign.8 Crucial to application of the defense
of res judicata is the principal that the doctrine precludes litigation of claims asserted,
but also claims which "could have been asserted." (Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588
P. 2d 689 (Utah 1978)) Again, before the First or Second actions were dismissed,
Utah Sign on October 8, 1994, cut down the Reagan sign on the Kitchen property.
Unequivocally, therefore, on the dates of dismissal of the First and Third Complaints,
October 11, 1994 and October 14, 1994, respectively, an action for "actual" forcible
entry, if not sufficiently initially plead in both actions, clearly existed and was capable

8

Again, for refreshment, the First Complaint wasfiledon September 9, 1994, as
number 940905718 assigned to Judge David S. Young and referred to hereinafter as
"the First Action." Three days later on September 12, 1994, Reagan commenced a
second action case number 940905728 assigned to Judge Kenneth Rigtrip and is
referred to hereinafter as "the Second Action." And finally, Reagan commenced yet a
third action against the Kitchens the following day, September 13, 1994, case number
940905780 which was assigned to Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki, hereinafter "the Third
Action."
-8-

of insertion in each action by perfunctorily amendment9, since neither action had yet
been served upon the Defendants. And clearly the factual issues of anticipated and
imminent forcible entry and actual forcible entry are inseparable and indistinguishable
and do not fall within the gambit of Crump or Gordon.
And finally, Utah Sign does not suggest that the Trial Courts' statement that
a motion under Rule 41 (a) would have resulted in dismissal of the case had it been
timely filed is determinative. It is inserted only to attest to the unequivocal nature of
the rule and the complete absence within the case of any objective and justifying
reason why Mitchell should not have timely asserted res judicata as a defense.

It

was patently obvious to the Trial Court that it could and should have been asserted,
and it remains patently obvious today. Mitchell's conduct is simply not, under any
stretch of the imagination, the reasonable efforts of a skillful tactician making a
reasoned and calculated procedural alternative. There is neither legal or nor factual
support to suggest that Mitchell's conduct was the permitted "selection of one among
several reasonable courses of action." (Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co., P.C., 160

9

URCP Rule 15 Amended and supplemental pleadings

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading
is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within
20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires.
-9-

A.D. 2d 487, 489, 554 N.Y.2nd 487 (1990))
If there is some patent or latent vagueness in Rule 41 (a), if Mitchell had
shown that the law is uncertain in this area, that facts exist which indicate that a
Trial Court was not likely to enforce the Rule, then admittedly an issue of fact exists
precluding summary judgment. However, it is respectfully submitted that the Rule
is straightforward, the facts suggesting that a Trial Court would trump a res judicata
defense under Rule 60(b) are totally non-existent in the record, and this is a matter
upon which the Court should rule summarily. Utah Signs motion for partial summary
judgment should have been granted.
POINT II.
RES JUDICATA
WOULD
HAVE
COMPLETELY
EXTINGUISHED REAGANS' CLAIMS TO OWNERSHIP OF
THE SIGN AND TO RIGHTS TO REMOVE OR RELOCATE
SAID SIGN. UTAH SIGN WOULD HAVE BEEN UNOPPOSED
IN ERECTING AND MAINTAINING A SIGN ON THE KITCHEN
PROPERTY AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE ABLE TO
RECOVER ITS ANTICIPATED LOSS PROFITS FROM SAID
SIGN.
Mitchell not only failed to invoke the protection to his clients under Rule 41(a),
but he also totally misunderstands the consequences of that failure to protect them.
Sometimes clients need protection from their own ill-advised or precipitous actions.
It is acknowledged that when Utah Sign entered upon the Kitchen property and cut
down the existing sign, as Mitchell warned them it would, it subjected Utah Sign to
-10-

a valid claim for damages as the cutting down was precipitous by two days. Mitchell
was aware of that consequence, therefore it is phantasmagorical that he choose not
to vigorously exert a procedural right, res judicata, in an effort to protect his clients
against the very serious claims he warned against. It is also clear from the record that
both the state and city officials charged with enforcing the Utah Outdoor Advertizing
Act and the regulations and municipal ordinances enacted to implement those
provisions were in a quandary as to how to enforce and apply the regulations and
which of the two competing companies should be permitted to maintain a sign,
precluding the other. All applicants must obtain a permit from the local municipality
to erect a sign-it is a prerequisite to issuance of the State permit.10 Once Utah Sign
obtained a permit from South Salt Lake City on September 2, 1994 it preempted the
issuance by the City of any other permit, locating or relocating a sign within 500' of
the site of the Utah Sign permit, yet Reagan was erroneously issued a permit by South
Salt Lake City on September 23, 1994. UDOT denied Utah Sign's permit, initially,
only because it had issued a permit to Reagan. It subsequently revoked Reagan's
permit so for a period of time there existed two non permitted signs within the
prohibited 500' proximity to each other. Finally, in resolution of the matter, both
governmental entities determined to await the outcome of the then presently filed
action(s) commenced by Reagan before deciding on which entity could maintain their
,0

Utah Administrative Code, R933-2-5(15).
-11-

respective sign:
Clarence G Sturzenegger, the Regional Director for UDOT charged
with the responsibility of supervising outdoor advertising in Utah stated:
u

It is my belief that, you know, we need to wait until the Court rules

on who has a right to place the sign there [the Kitchen property]."11
Arthur B. Coffin, the UDOT employee charged with responsibility of
issuing outdoor advertizing permits stated UDOT's position vis-a-vis
the conflicting

claims of Reagan and Utah Sign to the

Kitchen/Doctorman sites: "It is the State's position that they will not
issue a permit until this matter [testimony given in the twice dismissed
and sole remaining Reagan suit] is resolved as to who owns the
[Kitchen property] leasehold."12
John David Hansen, a building official for South Salt Lake City,
responsible for the enforcement of that city's ordinances governing
outdoor advertising testified: "At this time were are basically waiting
to see what the Court decides on ownership before we make any
decision on moving any sign."13

U

R. 1115-1117.

,2

R. 1112-1143.

,3

R. 1103-1104
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Kevin R. Watkins, the City attorney for South Salt Lake City testified
as to his advise to the city building department: "My recommendation
to the building official as counsel for the City would b that we would
take no action regarding the sign structure on the Doctorman property
until this matter [Reagan's twice dismissed action] is resolved."14
In other words, the issue was squarely left for resolution within Reagan's filed
actions to determine which of the competing applicants for permits could comply with
UDOT's regulations requiring proof of access to the underlying land.15 Had Mitchell
simply asserted the defense of res judicata under Rule 41 (a) the matter would have
been resolved by Utah Sign having an erected sign on the Kitchen property, Reagan's
claims of leasehold interest by his alleged "exercise of his option to renew" would
have been barred, and Reagan would have been barred from further asserting any
ownership interest in the Kitchen property because he had twice sought a
determination of his ownership of the sign, had voluntarily dismissed his claims and
consequently lost them. It is that simple. By failing to preclude Reagan from his

l4

R. 1111-1112.

15

"( 11) Written proof of lease or consent from site owner to erect or maintain an
outdoor advertising sign must be furnished by the applicant at the time of application for
an original permit. This proof may consist of an affidavit showing the landowner's name
and address, the sign owner's name, and the sign location by route, milepost, address, and
county. On renewal of the permit the applicant must certify that the sign site is still under
valid lease to the applicant." (Utah Administrative Code, R933-2-5(l 1))
-13-

continued claim to ownership of a leasehold on the Kitchen property andfromseeking
money damages for the wrongful usurpation of its property by Utah Sign Mitchell
left his clients facing an award of treble damages, resulting in Utah Sign being forced
to forego its claim to the Kitchen sign, pay a substantial settlement to Reagan, and
lose the anticipated income from the Kitchen sign. To suggest that Reagan had an
"unquestionable" right to erect a sign on the Doctorman precluding lost income by
Utah Sign is to totally ignore both the facts and law governing such claims. Utah
Sign had a valid city permit for the Kitchen sign. It had an erected sign.

It was

denied a permit for the sign only because UDOT issued a permit for the Doctorman
property after having been told that the Kitchen sign would "come down." If it did
not come down the Doctorman site would be prohibited because it would be within
500f feet of the Kitchen sign. Once the Kitchen sign fell "out of the hands and
control of Reagan" through the doctrine of res judicata, Reagan had no sign to
relocate, and could not have "relocated" it as he did in December, 1994. Mitchell
simply allowed Reagan to assert barred claims, costing Utah Sign its sign which it,
admittedly, wrongfully seized. Nevertheless, procedural bars are assertable by
anyone and everyone, including wrongdoers and windfall parties. The statute of
limitations permits bona fide debtors to avoid payment of acknowledged and
legitimate claims. The fact that an acknowledged and valid debt goes unpaid does not
preclude invocation of the procedural bar. Ernest Arthur Miranda committed a
-14-

burglary to which he confessed, but the exclusionary rule which emanated from his
appeal precluded his conviction of an admitted crime based on a wrongfully obtained
confession of guilt.16

Similarly, Utah Sign committed unlawful detainer.

It

precipitously took possession of another's sign and converted it to their own.
However, after filing two separate actions based on forcible detainer, and voluntarily
dismissing both without justification other than forum shopping, Utah Sign, but for
Mitchell's negligence, was insulated from any and all claims for damages as a result
of it's misconduct. They are not precluded from the benefit and protection of the rule
simply because their conduct may have been unlawful. Mitchell clearly failed to
protect his clients, and his clients lost substantial income as a direct and proximate
result of his inaction. Utah Sign is entitled to have it's claim for such damages
reinstated in a remand for trial of this matter.
Summary and Relief Sought
This Court should determine that Mitchell's conduct in filing a motion to
consolidate the previously dismissed actions rather than seeking summary dismissal
under the res judicata principles of Utah Rule Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is negligence
as a matter of law.
This Court should reverse the trial courts summary determination that Utah
Sign is precluded from seeking lost anticipated profits for a sign it erected on the
"See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
-15-

Kitchen property and the case should be remanded back to the trial court for trial with
Utah Sign permitted to show how it could have obtained a resolution of the conflicting
permits, erected its sign and submit a claim for anticipated lost profits to the jury.
DATED this 7 > ^ of February, 2002.
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